Iran: "Information Circular 665" about its nuclear activities

Below are excerpts (and a link to the full text) of a document sent by Iran to the IAEA last week. The document tries to recap the major developments and facts related to the ongoing negotiations about its nuclear activities.
One of the goals of the document is to fight the bias and the politicization that surrounds the discussions and media coverage of the Iranian nuclear issue.

Because in fact, a week later, I have yet to find any mention of it in the media, I am publishing some excerpts here. The full document was posted on the IAEA's website on January 24th, 2006.

• Iran is committed to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation
  "Islamic Republic of Iran, as the main victim of chemical weapons has always been among the most active member states of international organizations such as the IAEA and OPCW entrusted in combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Iran attaches great importance to international cooperation in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation[...] specially establishment of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Middle East[.]
  [...]
  Islamic Republic of Iran is fully committed to the principles of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and the nuclear weapons option is not in Iran's Defense Doctrine".
  

• Iran is cooperating with the IAEA on its nuclear program
  "During the last 27 years the Islamic Republic of Iran has spared no effort in cooperating with the Agency as far as its commitments under the NPT is concerned. Iran is the only Member State which voluntarily invited, in late 80s, the IAEA safeguard inspectors, headed by the DDG, to visit all sites and facilities at their discretion, even those locations not declarable under the Safeguards Agreement.
  Islamic Republic of Iran is the only Member State that is implementing the Additional Protocol prior to ratification by its legislative body.
  [...]
  Iran has proactively cooperated with the Agency in an extraordinary manner during the last two years with almost continuous inspections, amount to over 1400 man-day inspection, which is unprecedented in the history of the IAEA."
  

• Iran re-states that its decision to suspend enrichment activities in 2003 was voluntary and non-binding
  "In order to give the IAEA chance to conduct technical activities proving that the allegations [of high level uranium enrichment for weapons] are baseless and with the aim of decreasing the political tension, Iran voluntarily decided to suspend its enrichment activities.
  [...]
  There has always been consensus in the IAEA, particularly in the Board of Governors, that the suspension of enrichment activities is voluntary, non-legally binding measure. This essential non-legally binding parameter has been reflected in Tehran and Paris Agreements between Iran and EU3/EU as well as all decisions, conclusions and even resolutions of the Board of Governors."
  

• Iran is trying to restore evenhandedness in the coverage of the issue
  "[The document] reveals the facts confirming the exclusive nature of Iranian nuclear program and activities and full cooperation with international community. It also shows that the international has been, to a great extent misled with bias, politicized and exaggerated information on Iranian nuclear programs and activities.
  [...] While appreciating the tremendous constructive work by the IAEA,[...] Iran has however serious concerns about the misunderstandings, confusions, misperceptions and the underestimation of great progress so far made on political grounds."
  

Iran explains that the voluntary suspension of the uranium enrichment was offered by Iran to ease political tensions while investigating the traces of highly enriched uranium found in Natanz.
It also explains that the conclusions of this investigation have confirmed that the HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) particles were not from Iran, but due to prior contamination of the centrifuge outside of Iran.
Therefore, Iran argues that there is no reason to maintain the suspension on enrichment activities.

"After more than two and a half years of voluntary suspension, the triggering issue of contamination being resolved, there is no reason for Iranian Government to further deprive its nation from its inalienable right in doing research. The Agency was thus informed on 3 January 2006 that it will resume R&D as 10 January 2006, and requested the Agency to conduct timely and necessary preparations. Iran reiterated that such activities will be conducted in accordance with the Safeguards agreement of Iran with the IAEA. It further informed that it R&D is in small scale and not planned for nuclear fuel production. Thus, the suspension of enrichment on commercial scale, started since 2003, will be sustained."